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THE RIGHT QUESTIONS ABOUT SCHOOL
CHOICE: EDUCATION, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, AND THE COMMON GOOD
Richard W. Garnett*

As this Essay goes to press, the Supreme Court is considering
whether Ohio's school-choice program violates the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.' In my view, the
Ohio program is sound public policy, and it is consistent with the
Justices' present understanding of the Establishment Clause.' I
also believe that the Court will and should permit this experiment,
and our conversations about its merits, to continue.' The purpose
of this Essay, though, is not to predict or evaluate ex ante the
Court's decision. Instead, my primary aim is to suggest and then
* I thank Michael Barkey, A.J. Bellia, Nicole Stelle Garnett, Diane Meyers, John
Copeland Nagle, John Robinson, Robert Vischer, and Eugene Volokh for their comments
and assistance. Thanks are due also to Jeremy Samson and to the staff of the Cardozo
Law Review for their help and patience. Parts of this Essay grew out of a talk given at the
St. John's University School of Law in November of 2000. I should also note that I have
elsewhere asked, and tried to answer, many of the questions raised here. See, e.g., Richard
W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression of
Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841 (2001); Richard W. Garnett, Brown's Promise,
Blaine's Legacy, 17 CONST. COMM. 651 (2000) (reviewing JOSEPH P. VITERIT-I,
CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

(1999)); Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education,
and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109 (2000); Nicole Stelle Garnett &
Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 301 (2000).
' In late 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a
lower-court ruling striking down Cleveland's school-choice program on First Amendment
grounds. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 961 (6th Cir. 2000). As expected,
the United States Supreme Court agreed to review that decision. Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 533 U.S. 983 (2001); see Charles Lane, Supreme Court: On the Sidelines, for Now,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at A5 ("If the court upholds the Cleveland plan, it could
reenergize a pro-voucher movement that stalled in recent years[.]").
2 For a very different view, see, e.g., Editorial, A Matter of Church and State, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20,2002, at A20 ("Even if the voucher program were not unconstitutional,....
we would object to it because it drains human and financial resources from public
education without solving the real problems facing American education.").
3 Cf Washington v. Glucksberg, 531 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) ("Throughout the Nation,
Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality,
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue,
as it should in a democratic society.").
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sketch a few broad themes that--once the decision comes down,
the dust settles, and the "spin" subsides-could enrich our
deliberations about school-choice proposals specifically, and also,
more generally, about education, religious freedom, and
democratic citizenship.
INTRODUCTION

Not long ago, a commentator observed that it is "getting
harder every day to be an informed and compassionate opponent
of vouchers." 4 After all, she noted,
[f]amilies of means can make choices about education. They
move to neighborhoods with good schools. They can send their
kids to private or parochial schools. Poor parents have no such
choices. If their local schools are failing, their kids are trapped.
And far too many of our schools are failing: This is the
challenge that demands our attention.5
Arthur Levine, president of Columbia University Teachers
College, agrees, though he puts the matter considerably more
bluntly: "[T]o force children into inadequate schools is to deny
them any chance of success. To do so simply on the basis of their
parents' income is a sin."6
Should parents enjoy the right to decide where, what, and
from whom their children will learn? More particularly, should
governments provide poor and working-class parents the means
necessary to make meaningful this right? The answer to these
questions, I think, is "yes." The point of this Essay, though, is to
suggest that school choice is not simply a market-oriented reform
tool; nor should the themes of the choice-in-education debate be
limited to efficiency, effectiveness, competition, test scores, or
profit. Instead, school choice is best viewed and framed as a moral
question, as an "issue of civil rights and basic justice,"7 as
constitutive of the common good, and-for some-as a crucial
aspect of parents' responsibility and vocation to "participate in
God's creative activity" 8 by directing the education and formation
4 Geneva Overholser, Coming Around on Vouchers, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1999, at
A15.
5 Id.; see also Paul E. Peterson, A Liberal Case for Vouchers, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 4,
1999, at 29.
6 Arthur Levine, Why I'm Reluctantly Backing Vouchers, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1998,
at A28 (emphasis added).
7 John E. Coons, Populism and ParentalChoice, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2000, at 16.
8 Pope John Paul II, Familiaris consortio [Apostolic Exhortation on the Family] 36
(St. Paul ed. 1981).
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of their children.
Today there is widespread, though certainly not unanimous,
agreement that "far too many" of our nation's government
schools9 are failing. ° To be sure, we have assigned these schools,
their teachers, and their administrators a probably impossible
amalgam of tasks. We ask them to form productive and tolerant
citizens; inculcate decent habits, dispositions, and manners; impart
knowledge, critical thinking, and practical skills; and even provide
day care for over-extended and sometimes negligent parents. We
should concede, therefore, that the problems facing government
schools, and the reasons so many of them fall short, are complex
and interrelated. Still, they are failing.II
Many have urged that we respond to this failure by
introducing competition, empowering parents to choose from
among a diverse array of schools, freeing schools from
bureaucratic meddling and red tape, encouraging experimentation
rather than standardization, weakening if not eliminating the
government's effective monopoly on publicly funded education,
and-most controversially-including private and religious schools
in the education-reform effort.1 2 In May of 2001, for example, at
9 The term "government schools" is not intended to be tendentious; it is, at least in
this context, simply a more accurate term than "public schools." See Coons, supra note 7,
at 16 (noting the "widespread but false assumption that our state schools currently provide
a truly 'public' education"); Rev. John J. Coughlin, Common Sense in Formationfor the
Common Good-Justice White's Dissents in the ParochialSchool Aid Cases: Patron of
Lost Causes or Precursorof Good News, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 261, 272 (1992) ("The
ideal of public education ought not to be confused with the institutional reforms that were
dedicated to building a uniform system of schools.., to replace the diversity and
autonomy in public education that preceded the reform movement.").
10 See Overholser, supra note 4; see also Office of Educ. Research and Improvement,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., NAEP 1999: Trends in Academic Progress:Three Decades of Student
Performance (Aug. 24, 2000), available at http://www.nces.gov (detailing evidence
demonstrating that, despite decades of massive and steadily increasing funding, academic
achievement in government schools has not improved, and troubling achievement gaps
remain between rich and poor, and minority and non-minority students); Editorial, The
Education of a President,WALL ST. J., June 19, 2001, at A22 (discussing NAEP results and
stating that "[t]his is not simply failure. This is mass fraud. And in an economy that
increasingly puts a premium on skills, this is a system condemning too many of these
children to second-class citizenship in the American Dream.").
I See generally DIANE RAVITCH & JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW
CENTURY: THE REDESIGN OF URBAN EDUCATION (1999); JOSEPH P. VITERITTI,
CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

(1999); MYRON LIEBERMAN, PUBLIC EDUCATION: AN AUTOPSY (1993).
12 For general background on the history and contours of the school-choice debate, see.
generally TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC (2001);
JOHN F. WITTE,
AMERICA'S FIRST
CHUBB & TERRY
JOHN E. COONS &

THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
VOUCHER PROGRAM (2000); VITERITTI, supra note 11; JOHN E.
M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990);
STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR

FAMILY CONTROL

(1978); see also Editorial, A Voucher Test, WASH.

POST., June

4, 2001,
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my own University of Notre Dame, President Bush chided those
skeptical of his efforts to enlist the zeal of faith-based
organizations, including religious schools, in the government's
anti-poverty and social-welfare efforts.
He reminded our
graduates that "America has a long tradition of accommodating
and encouraging religious institutions when they pursue public
goals"' 3 and insisted that while "government should never fund the
teaching of faith, ... it should support the good works of the
faithful."14 Just a few days later, though, the United States House
of Representatives "dealt a final blow to President Bush's
vouchers plan," a plan that its opponents insisted would have
"drain[ed] needed funds away from the most imperiled public
schools."' 5
And so it goes. Acres of trees, millions of ballots, billions of
bytes, and nearly fifty years after Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman
proposed a universal system of school vouchers that "would
minimize the role of government in education and replace public
schools with privately-run institutions supported by taxes,"' 6 the
debate over his and other school-choice proposals rages on. A
recent spate of legislative proposals and enactments, court
decisions, ballot-initiative fights, and book releases-combined
with the Supreme Court's impending decision in the Cleveland
voucher case-prompted one activist to announce recently that it
is "High Noon" for vouchers. Parental choice in education was,
of course, front-and-center during the 2000 election cycle; it is
discussed and dissected in our universities, churches, think tanks,
learned journals, and publishing houses; and it has long been at the
at A18 ("Congress should be willing to explore what might come of giving more choices to
some.., low-income students."); Overholser, supra note 4 ("Could vouchers be a suitable
companion to [other] improvements?... I've still got plenty of questions. But giving
vouchers enough of a test to provide more answers begins to look like the right thing to
do."); Michael S. Greve, The End of Education Reform, WEEKLY STANDARD, May 21,
2001, at 16 (arguing that "[w]ithout parental choice, accountability is a sham").
13 Mike Allen, President Urges War on Poverty, WASH. POST, May 21, 2001, at Al.
"4 Tim Jones, Bush Touts Faith-BasedAidto Poor,CHI. TRIB., May 21,2001, at 1.
15 Juliet Eilperin & Dana Milbank, House Panel Votes to Kill PrivateSchool Vouchers,
WASH. POST., May 23, 2001, at Al. The Senate did likewise a few weeks later, with
Senator Clinton insisting that, although choice "sounds so good,.., we know that
vouchers do not help the students who need the help the most. They do nothing to help
improve public schools. Vouchers only further segregate and stratify our public schools."
Lizette Alvarez, Senate Rejects Tuition Aid, a Key to Bush Education Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13,2001, at A28.
16 VITERITri, supra note 11, at 53. See generally Milton Friedman, The Role of
Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Robert A. Solo
ed., 1955); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
17 Ron Unz, High Noon for Vouchers, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (June 20, 2000), at
http://www.nationalreview.com ("Now, suddenly, a chain of unconnected events will
decide the triumph or collapse of the voucher movement-by the end of the year.").
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heart of our public conversation about the future, direction, and
content of education reform. 8
Still, "high noon" or not, the school-choice debate's terms,
tone, and labels, and its rhetorical moves and flourishes, are likely
tediously familiar to anyone reading these words. They are so
familiar, in fact, that one might reasonably wonder whether there
could really be anything left to say on the subject, and whether
there is any room for progress, or any reason to expect it. I believe
and hope that there is.
Three questions have tended to dominate our discussions
about choice-based education reform: First, are school vouchers
constitutional, or does school choice violate the "separation of
church and state" supposedly required by the First Amendment?
Second, will school-choice "work"? And, finally, do the asserted
"costs" of choice-namely, its purported effects on the
government schools and their mission-outweigh its benefits?
These are, all agree, questions worth answering. I contend,
first, that school-choice programs, even if they allow religious
schools, and parents who choose them, to participate, need not
"establish" religion in violation of the First Amendment. And,
second, the research to date has convinced me that choice likely
would "work"; that is, that it would improve the quality of
American education. That said, I am under no illusions that this
conclusion can or will ever be proved to the satisfaction of those
for whom opposition to school choice is a matter of ideological
commitment or constitutional principle.19 In any event, though, as
John Coons has stated, "the case for choice in education goes
much deeper than.., efficiency." Rather, "[c]hoice... needs to
be loved for its own sake, or at least for a reason more noble than
its capacity to make life better for the producers."20 Finally, in
response to the claim that choice would undermine the
government's schools and their mission, I submit that these schools
have too long enjoy a privileged, but unexamined "baseline" status
that cannot be easily justified. Although, for instance, the New
York Times cheered recently when Congress dropped an "illconsidered voucher provision"-a provision which, in the Times'

18For an excellent and up-to-date summary of choice-related education proposals and
reforms across the country, see NINA SHOKRAII REES, SCHOOL CHOICE 2000: WHAT'S
HAPPENING IN THE STATES (2000), available at http://www.heritage.org/schools/2000 (last
modified Dec. 7,2000). This work is updated regularly at the Heritage Foundation
website.
19Recall here the above-quoted remarks of Senator Clinton. See Alvarez, supra note
15.
20 John E. Coons, School Choice and Simple Justice, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 1992, at 15.
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view, would be a "dangerous drain on public school resources '
the editors never explained how these "resources" came to be
"public school resources," rather than public educationresources.22
These are, again, important questions, but I wonder if they get
to the heart of the matter? These, after all, are the facts: When it
comes to school choice, most Americans already have it; those
who do not have it, want it; and those who do not have it are, by
23
and large, those whose moral claims to it are the strongest.
Choice, remember, is neither a gimmick nor a novelty; rather,
"[c]hoice is everywhere in American education. '24 And yet, there
are many-millions--of parents who have no choice but to send
their children to failing government-run schools and who would
rather send them elsewhere. These are, as Senator Judd Gregg
reminded his colleagues recently, "real people who are locked in
inner-city schools[,] who didn't have the option for a better
education like folks with more money, [and] who are seeing their
children left behind. '25 And, as NBC News commentator Tim
Russert asked, during a debate between Senator Bill Bradley and
Vice President Al Gore, "[w]hy don't poor, minority moms with
their kids, who could not possibly deal with the chaos of public
-

21 Editorial, How to Leave No Child Behind, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2001, at A16; see
also Helen Dewar, Senate Drops Vouchers from Education Bill, WASH. POST, June 13,
2001, at A12 (reporting Senator Kennedy's objection that "vouchers would divert already
scarce resources from public schools"); A Matter of Church and State, supra note 2
(complaining that the Ohio program "drains human and financial resources from public
education").
22 Professor Eugene Volokh has observed, in response to the "drain on public
resources" argument, that any "harm" inflicted on government schools by educational
choice is just "an outcome of the fact that private school parents would no longer have to
pay twice-once for the government-run education they found unsatisfactory and once for
the privately run education they are buying in its stead." Eugene Volokh, Equal
Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341, 362
(1999).
23 VITERITTI, supra note 11, at 11-12 (noting that "choice already exists for many if not
most Americans" and that "those who do not enjoy choice really want it for their own
children"). Low-income citizens and racial minorities are more likely to support choice in
education than are middle- and high-income whites. See, e.g., Michael W. Lynch,
Rampaging Toward Choice, REASON, Jan. 2000, at 24, 26 ("Polls show that school choice
is far more popular with minorities than with whites, and most popular with low- and
modest-income minorities"); James Brooke, Minorities Flock to Cause of Vouchers for
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1997, at Al. But see William Raspberry, A Little
Knowledge Can Be a Meaningless Thing, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1999, at A23 (suggesting
that parents' support for school choice is generally uninformed).
24 School
Choice Is
Widespread-Unless You're
Poor, available at
http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org.what (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) (advertisement
sponsored by the Black Alliance for Educational Options, quoting WHO CHOOSES, WHO

LOSES?

CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF SCHOOL CHOICE

(Richard Elmore & Bruce Fuller eds., 1996)).
2- Alvarez, supra note 15.

2002] RIGHT QUESTIONS ABOUT SCHOOL CHOICE 1287
26
school, deserve a break?
Now, as I mentioned earlier, I am confident that the Court
will hold, and that the current canon of relevant precedent both
permits and requires it to hold, that religion-neutral school-choice
programs are constitutional. That the Constitution permits us to
experiment with such programs, though, does not mean that we
should. We need to ask: what reasons are there for enhancing
parents' ability to direct and control their children's education?
This question invites, I think, not only numbers-crunching and
data-grinding on the nuts-and-bolts of education reform-though
such crunching and grinding is needed, too-but also deeper
reflections about the purpose of education, the authority of the
state, the integrity of the family, the demands of pluralism,
political liberalism, and religious freedom, and the dignity of the
human person.
Again-who should decide where, what, and from whom
children will learn? Is the education of young people the
prerogative of the contemporary liberal state, and its purpose the
inculcation of government-approved dispositions, attitudes, and
beliefs?27 Or is education an obligation, vocation, and right of
parents,28 one that is inextricably linked to religious liberty29 and
political pluralism?30 Is the point of choice-based reform simply to
spur improvements in government schools through competition?
Is it merely to more effectively and efficiently deliver data and
transmit "skill sets"? Or is it to make good on the obligation of
public authority to promote the authentic common good?

I.

DOES THE CONSTITUTION PERMIT SCHOOL CHOICE?

It would be reasonable-commendable, in fact-to oppose
experimentation with religion-neutral school-choice programs if
the Constitution did not permit them.3 So--do such programs
26 Meet the Press: Vice-President Al Gore and Former Senator Bill Bradley Discuss
Numerous PoliticalTopics (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Meet the
Press]. Mr. Russert's question went unanswered.

27 See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIL EDUCATION IN A
(2000); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY

(1987).
28 See Pope John Paul 1I, supra note 8, 38 (referring to the "dignity and vocation" of
families' "educational role").
29 See, e.g., VITERITTI, supra note 11, at 117-44.
30 See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A
Defense of Educational Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847 (1999); Stephen G. Gilles, On
Educating Children:A ParentalistManifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996).
31 See Overholser, supra note 4 ("There are two good reasons not to give poor families
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breach the "wall of separation between church and state" often
(but mistakenly) said to be required by the First Amendment's
"no establishment" command? 2 They do not. The better
constitutional argument,33 I think, is that governments may not
discriminate against "religious ideas, religious people, [and]
religious schools" in the administration of general-welfare and
education-assistance programs.34 That is, official hostility toward
religious education and parents to choose it is neither required nor
permitted by the First Amendment. Choice-in-education is more,
not less, consonant than monopoly or "liberal statism"35 with the
religious freedom promised in our constitutional traditions and in
our Constitution's text.
Now, if one were to browse the tables of contents of the law
reviews and elite journals of opinion, or watch the weekdayevening or Sunday morning talk shows, one might reasonably
conclude that school-choice's constitutionality is still an unresolved
question. Actually, there is a remarkably wide and widening
consensus that the "wall of separation" conjured by Justice Hugo
Black in the 1947 Everson decision3 6 is neither so high, nor so
impermeable, that it forbids well crafted, non-discriminatory
school-choice programs.37 Professor Tribe has put it this way:
public money to give them choices .... [I]t might be unconstitutional because it could
involve government support for religious schools.").
32 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
33 See Good News Bible Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that
the First Amendment neither required nor permitted discriminatory denial of access to
public-school facilities to a religious student group).
34 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 717 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
35 Stephen G. Gilles, Liberal Parentalismand Children's Educational Rights, 26 CAP.
U. L. REV. 9, 11 (1997) (discussing "liberal statism"); Stephen L. Carter, Religious
Freedom as if Religion Matters: A Tribute to Justice Brennan, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1065
(1999) ("When I say statism, I do not simply mean, as the formal definition would suggest,
a preference for state solutions; I have in mind a sense of the state's rightness, or
goodness-an empirical belief that the state is less likely than the individual to make a
moral error.").
36 Everson, 330 U.S. at 1. In Everson, Justice Hugo Black laid an unstable foundation
for the entire edifice of the Court's Establishment Clause case law and imposed an
unhistorical historical gloss on the Clause, one that has distracted courts and distorted
public debate ever since. The historical account on which Justice Black relied in Everson
has been widely criticized. See, e.g., John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1949) ("The First Amendment has been stood on its head.
And in that position it cannot but gurgle nonsense."). It appears that Justice Black's views
on the constitutionality of aid to students at religious schools were colored by, among
other things, his anti-Catholicism. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 251-52 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); see also ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO
BLACK 87, 104, 137 & n. 521 (1994). For another Justice's quite different historical
account, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37 For a few recent discussions of this question, see generally John H. Garvey, What
Does the Constitution Say About Vouchers?, 44 B.B. J. 14 (2000); Steffen N. Johnson, A
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"Any objection that anyone would have to a voucher program
would have to be policy-based and could not rest on legal doctrine.
One would have to be awfully clumsy to write voucher legislation
that could not pass constitutional scrutiny ....[A]id to parents...

would be constitutional."38 This is because, as Professor Joseph
Viteritti has observed,
[t]he Rehnquist Court has promulgated a set of legal principles
that makes it possible for the government to provide tuition
assistance to parents of children who attend religious schools so
long as such aid is administered in a neutral fashion and
students attend such. schools as a matter of parental choice.3 9

Thus, Professor Tribe predicts, "the Court would uphold an
educational voucher scheme that would permit parents to decide
which schools, public or private, their children should attend." 0
This is not the place for detailed argument about the real
meaning or first principles of the First Amendment, or about how
exactly one should go about identifying the text's true import. My
aim is not to settle all disputes about what those who drafted and
ratified the First Amendment meant, or were understood to mean,
when they proscribed federal laws "respecting an establishment of
religion."'" Nor is it to identify the grand unifying theory of the
Religion Clause,42 or even to exhaustively trace its zig-zag trail

Civil LibertarianCase for the Constitutionalityof School Choice, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTs. L.J. 1 (1999/2000); Volokh, supra note 22; Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly
AnachronisticCase Against School Vouchers, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
375 (1999); Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutional,and Why They're Not,
13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 397 (1999).
38 Not the Unusual Suspects: The Most Wanted Quotes on Vouchers and School Choice,
POLICY REV. ONLINE (Jan.-Feb. 1999), at http://www.policyreview.com/jan99/quotes.html
(last visited Jan. 8, 2002).
39 VITERITFI, supra note 11, at 143.
40 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-10, at 1223 (2d ed.,
Foundation Press 1988).
41 For an excellent and comprehensive account, see GERALD V. BRADLEY, CHURCHSTATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987). For a more general overview of religious
freedom in America, see, e.g., JOHN WITrE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 149-84 (2000);
JOHN NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1998).
42 For an argument that there is no such grand theory, and that the Framers and
ratifiers intended merely to disable the new federal government from interfering with the
religion-related decisions of the various States' legislatures, see STEVEN D. SMITH,
FOREORDAINED

FAILURE:

THE

QUEST

FOR A

CONSTITUTIONAL

PRINCIPLE

OF

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995). Whether or not Professor Smith is right about this (I
believe that he is), there is no reason to think that the Constitution was intended to
require discrimination against religion, religiously-motivated choices, religious institutions,
or religious schools. See Volokh, supra note 22, at 351 ("[M]y sense of the Framers'
worldview is that they did not think the government was required to discriminate against
religion.").
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through the United States Reports. More modest claims will
suffice, for now.
Justice Holmes famously and provocatively asserted, "[t]he
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law."43 And although I like to
think that there is quite a bit more to the legal enterprise than did
Justice Holmes, it is enough to say simply that the First
Amendment permits choice-based education reform because, in
light of the current body of case law and doctrine, the Supreme
Court will most likely use the Cleveland case to make explicit what
is already implicit in its most recent and relevant decisionsnamely, that school-choice programs provide benefits to parents
and children, not to religion and churches, and are therefore
permissible policy choices, not unconstitutional "establishments"
of religion.
The Court's most recent school-aid decision, Mitchell v.
Helms," warrants this confidence. 5 In that case, six Justices
agreed that the Establishment Clause permits state and local
governments to loan "educational materials and equipment"library books, computers, televisions, etc.-purchased with federal
funds directly to religious and private schools. 6 Although creative
courts and lawyers can and will distinguish the program at issue
and the questions presented in Mitchell from those raised in the
school-choice context,47 most believe that this ruling signals, if it
does not determine, the constitutional fate of school-choice
experiments. 8 Both Justice Thomas's plurality opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion-joined, to the surprise of some,
by Justice Breyer--emphasized the importance in school-aid cases
of two factors, both of which are present in the school-choice
context: first, the "neutrality" of the program's eligibility and
benefit-disbursement criteria and, second, the role of intervening
43Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).

- 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
45 That said, Professor Laycock has wisely warned against taking too much for granted
in this area. See Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH.
LAW. 25, 53 (2000) ("If you take Rosenberger, Agostini, and Mitchell to their logical

conclusion, vouchers are constitutional-but no one should assume the cases will be
carried to their logical conclusion.").
46 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801 (describing details of the program in question). For a more
detailed analysis of the questions and issues presented in Mitchell, see David S. Petron,
Finding Direction in Indirection: The Direct/Indirect Aid Distinction in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence,75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1233 (2000).
47See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 960-61 (6th Cir. 2000).
48See, e.g.,
Jodi Wilgoren, Court Ruling Fuels Debate on Vouchersfor Education, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A27; Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Charles R. Hokanson, Jr., Court
Ruling Augurs Well for Vouchers, WALL. ST.J., June 29, 2000, at A26.
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and independent "private choice."49 Justice Thomas pointed out,
for example, that the resources at issue were made available on the
basis of criteria having nothing to do with religion, and that they
reached religious schools not by government fiat but only if and to
the extent that individual parents selected such schools for their
children. 0 Similarly, Justice O'Connor observed that the program
"[did] not define aid recipients by reference to religion" and did
not "result[] in governmental indoctrination."'"
Mitchell is a welcome step in the Court's gradual
rehabilitation of its Establishment Clause doctrine. 2 Still, Mitchell
notwithstanding, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed recently a lower federal court's decision striking
down the Cleveland program on Establishment Clause grounds,"
holding that the program "has the primary effect of advancing
religion, and that it constitutes an endorsement of religion and
54
sectarian education in violation of the Establishment Clause.
The Sixth Circuit misread the relevant precedents and missed the
import of Mitchell;" again, its decision is being reviewed, and
49 530 U.S. at 809-14.
50

Id. at 830.

51 Id. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).

Although Justice
O'Connor was careful to insist that the "neutrality" of a government program is not
outcome-determinative in cases involving "direct" aid to religious schools, nothing in her
opinion calls into question the centrality of private choice to the constitutional analysis of
a true voucher program. See id. at 841-42 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52 It is worth noting that, two years before the Court's decision in Mitchell, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court provided an excellent blueprint for the eventual definitive
resolution of the First Amendment questions posed by school-choice programs. See
Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998) (rejecting
Establishment Clause challenge to Milwaukee's Parental Choice Program). As in
Mitchell, the key factors in the Jackson court's analysis were the neutrality of the program
and the role of private choice in determining at which schools-public or private, religious
or secular--parents and children used their educational benefits. See Jackson, 578 N.W.
2d at 613-18. The Supreme Courts of Ohio and Arizona have taken a similar approach in
recent cases. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999); Kotterman v.
Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999).
53 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), affirming, 72 F. Supp. 2d
834 (D. Ohio. 1999).
54 Zelman, 234 F.3d at 961. As for the emphasis placed by the Mitchell and other
courts on neutral criteria and private choice, the court concluded that the Cleveland
program-although neutral on its face with respect to religion-was not really neutral,
because most of the schools that had chosen to participate in the program were religious.
See id. at 958-59. And, the court concluded, parents' "private choice" to use benefits
received through the program at either secular or religious schools was "illusory," because
no public schools and few non-religious private schools had elected to participate and to
receive voucher recipients. See id. at 959-60.
55 Judge Ryan, in a scathing dissent, suggested that the court's misreading of the
controlling cases was no accident.
[Tlhe majority opinion is nothing more than an attack upon the philosophical
and cultural desirability of publicly funded educational choice for the poor. This
case and its result-sentencing nearly 4,000 poverty-level, mostly minority,
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should be reversed, by the United States Supreme Court.5 6
Step back for a moment, though, from precedents and
doctrine: Surely it is clear, both as a matter of law and as a matter
of common sense, that the Constitution is not violated simply
because money that was once in a government account somehow
finds its way to a church or religious institution? Social Security
beneficiaries, veterans, government employees, college students,
and even lottery winners receive funds from the government, and
many of them donate or pay portions of those funds to churches,
schools, and charities. No one thinks "religion" is thereby
"establish[ed]," even if religious organizations or institutions
benefit in some way from such donations. School choice, rightly
understood, empowers parents, not government, to choose to
direct funds to religious schools. And when parents do so, they are
not unconstitutionally "establishing" religion any more than if they
were government employees whose entire income is delivered via
government checks, or if they were to pay tuition using benefits
received through a social-welfare program like Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families or Social Security, or if their
decisions were made possible only through the government's
generous decision to subsidize their lifestyle decisions through the
home-mortgage deduction. 7
The crucial point here is that the First Amendment limits
government conduct; it has nothing to say about private action
(other than to suggest that private assembly, speech, and worship
are worth protecting)." Indeed,
children in Cleveland to return to the indisputably failed Cleveland public
schools from which, in many cases, they escaped as long as three years ago-is
an exercise in raw judicial power having no basis in the First Amendment or in
the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Id. at 974.
What is perhaps most surprising about the Sixth Circuit's decision, though, is that it
flies in the face of the Supreme Court's November 1999 decision to stay, pending appeal,
the decision entered by the district court. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 528 U.S. 983 (1999).
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the stay order, but said nothing about its significance.
Zelnan, 234 F.3d at 950.
56 The Court's recent decision in Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98
(2001), provides additional reasons for optimism. In that case, the Court held that the
First Amendment neither permits nor requires government officials to discriminate
against a Christian youth group, on the basis of its religious viewpoint, in providing access
to public-school facilities after school hours. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas
emphasized yet again the constitutional importance of a program's neutrality toward
religion. Justice Breyer concurred in part, noting that government neutrality is one, "but
only one," of the considerations relevant to deciding whether a government policy violates
the Establishment Clause. 533 U.S. at 127.
57 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997).
58 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
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[t]he very same conduct can be either constitutionally protected
or constitutionally forbidden, depending on whether those who
engage in it are acting in their 'private' or their 'public'
capacities. If a group of people get together and form a church,
that is the free exercise of religion. If the government forms a
church, that is an establishment of religion. One is protected;
one is forbidden. 9

Americans are permitted, for example, to teach our children
that Catholicism is true. The government, however, is not
permitted an opinion on the matter.' And so, when government
allows and enhances freedom of educational choice, and refuses to
discriminate against religious schools or to single out religion,
religious expression, and religious belief for special disadvantage,6'
it respects, rather than undermines, First Amendment commands.62
II.

COULD SCHOOL CHOICE "WORK"? SHOULD IT MATTER?

Notwithstanding the recent setbacks in Congress and in the
Sixth Circuit, more and more centrists, liberals, and progressives,
who might be ideologically predisposed to suspicion toward
privatization schemes generally, and perhaps also toward the
distinctive and particularistic missions of religious schools, have
confronted the widespread failure of government schools and the
toll this failure exacts from the disadvantaged. As a result, it
seems that a consensus is beginning to form around the idea that
perhaps the time has come for prudent and reasonable
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.").
59Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of
Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REV. 163, 184.
60See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872) ("The law knows no
heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.").
61 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("The government
may not.., impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.");
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Glovemment may
not use religion as a basis for classification for the imposition of duties, penalties,
privileges or benefits.").
62 Several courts and commentators have recognized that not only does the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause not require discrimination against religious
expression and institutions, it forbids it, as do the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses
of the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See
generally, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Brown's Promise, Blaine's Legacy, 17 CONST. COMM.
651 (2000) (reviewing JOSEPH P. VITERIrrI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1999)); Volokh, supra note 22; Michael A.
Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to
Establishment Clause Litigation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311 (1986). The Supreme
Court's decision in Good News would appear to provide additional support for this view.
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experiments with charter schools, vouchers, tuition tax-credits, and
other choice-based reforms. As one convert put it recently, "[a]s a
parent of an urban public high-school student, I flinch at anything
that drains resources from public schools. But I have a choice.
Keeping them from others because of a vague threat seems
increasingly hard to justify. ' 63 Even the doubters seem willing to
concede a limited place for vouchers, "in conjunction with broad
reforms."' "I've still got plenty of questions," one such skeptic
insists, "[b]ut giving vouchers enough of a test to provide more
answers begins to look like the right thing to do." 65 Elite opinionmakers like the Washington Post agree: "Offering vouchers does
not take away the obligation to improve troubled public schools.
But it's also true that too may students pay dearly, and for the rest
because they have no alternative to a failing public
of their lives,
66
school.
This new openness to experimentation is both promising and
justified. I am confident that giving parents the ability to exercise
meaningfully their moral and constitutional right to educate their
children as they see fit will, in fact, improve public education-i.e.,
the education of the public-and, more specifically, offer new
opportunities to disadvantaged children. But am I sure about this?
Can we be sure? Should we wait until we are sure? No, no, and
no.
Professor Viteritti observed a few years ago that
[b]ehind the choice debate that has occupied policymakers so
intensely for the past 10 years is the fantastic notion that
someday a group of dispassionate experts will objectively reach
a judgment to determine whether or how it is safe to translate
the explosive idea [of choice] into policy without incurring
unwitting harm. 67
The Washington Post, for example, called recently for limited
voucher experiments that "might help some individual students
trapped in failing public schools while also providing useful data to
inform the long-running debate about vouchers' potential
63

Overholser, supra note 4; see also, e.g., William Raspberry, Selling Out Our Schools,

WASH. POST, June 15, 2001, at A33 (reporting Dr. Howard Fuller's question, "[djon't the

middle-class opponents of choice worry that their opposition condemns poor children to
schools their own children have long since escaped?").
64 Id.
65 Id.; see also James Q. Wilson, Why Not Try Vouchers?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001,
at A27 (observing, with respect to vouchers and other "Charitable Choice"-type
proposals, "[b]efore trying anything on a national scale, perhaps we should mount an
experimental demonstration program in a few cities where these ideas can be tested.").
66 A Voucher Test, supra note 12, at A18.
67 Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice: Beyond the Numbers, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 23,
2000, at 38.
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effects." 68 Viteritti insists, though, that just as it is "fantastic" to
expect iron-clad expert consensus about, or validation of, choicein-education, it is "absurd" to think that "we should not try choice
until it can be proven to work, since it is impossible to demonstrate
the viability of any idea that has not been given a chance." 9
Fantastic or not, the search for a definitive judgment
continues, and hardly a month goes by in which a new panel of
experts does not announce new "findings" or "conclusions"
concerning the "effectiveness" of those few public and private
school-choice programs currently up and running. 0 For some
choice supporters, every up-tick in fourth-graders' reading scores
is a vindication of the power of market competition; likewise, for
some opponents, every experiment that fails to achieve dramatic
gains over the status quo exposes the hubris of the boosters of
choice and competition.7' As I have already mentioned, those who
contend that school choice would reduce, not increase racial
segregation; that choice would improve, not 'threaten, the lot of
low-income and center-city students; that a choice-based education
system would result, on balance, in a better educated citizenry; and
that students whose parents are permitted to choose their schools
will, for the most part, be as, if not more, tolerant, respectful,
decent, and public-minded as today's government-educated
children appear to me to have the better of the argument.72 But, in
68 A Voucher Test, supra note 12.
69 Viteritti, supra note 67.

70 There is no way to do justice here to the massive and growing body of choice-related
empirical scholarship. For a few examples, see Paul E. Peterson & David E. Campbell, An
Evaluation of the Children's Scholarship Fund (May 2001), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg; Jay P. Greene, An Evaluation of the Florida A-Plus
Accountability and School Choice Program (Feb. 2001),
available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg; Jay P. Greene, A Survey of Results from Voucher

Experiments: Where

We

Are

and What

We

Know

(July

2000),

available at

http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr l1.htm; Paul E. Peterson et al., An Evaluation
of the Cleveland Voucher Program After

Two

Years (June

1999), available at

http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg. Much more data and research relating to educational
choice are available at and through the following web sites, to name only a few: The
Program on Educational Policy and Governance, at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg; The
Black Alliance for Educational Options, at http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org; The Center
for Education Reform, at http://www.edreform.com; and The Brookings Institution, at
http://www.brook.edu.
71 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 15 (reporting reasons given by Senators Clinton and
Kennedy for opposing President Bush's proposed modest school-choice experiment).
72 For research suggesting that school choice contributes to racial integration in
education, see, e.g., Jay P. Greene, The Racial, Economic, and Religious Context of
ParentalChoice in Cleveland (Oct. 8, 1999), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg;
Jay P. Greene, A Survey of Results from Voucher Experiments: Where We Are and What

We Know (July 2000), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_1l.htm
[hereinafter A Survey of Results]; Howard L. Fuller & George A. Mitchell, The Impact of
School Choice on Integration in Milwaukee Private Schools (June 2000), available at
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Viteritti's words, "not everyone would agree. Nor will they
ever[.]"73 I agree. There is no point to waiting, and no justification
for waiting, for the data to demonstrate to everyone's satisfaction
the need for, and soundness of, choice-based reform. After all, I
suspect that opposition to choice owes less to worries about holes
in the research than to a cluster of concerns about the job security
of union members and public employees, the place of religious
education and discourse in a liberal society, and the moral and
civic balkanization thought to be associated with the privatization
of education. And so, what if we were to resign ourselves to the
fact that the numbers, data, models, and statistics will always be
difficult for reasonable, well-meaning people to decipher? In
other words, as Professor Viteritti puts it, why not "call it a
draw?"74 Instead of bickering about the meaning and significance
of the information we have managed to glean from those few
school-choice experiments that have managed to survive the
gauntlet of litigation and regulation, why not ask whether good
reasons exist, in the face of widespread demand by deserving
parents, for refusing to embrace choice? Instead of saddling
reformers with the burden of demonstrating, with Aristotelian
rigor, the efficiency and effectiveness of choice,75 why not flip the
question around-Why not? Parents want choice-why should
they not have it?

http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/research. For more on the student-achievement question,
see generally William J. Howard et al., Test Score Effects of School Vouchers in Dayton,
Ohio, New York City, and Washington, D.C.: Evidence from Randomized Field Trials
(Aug. 2000), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg; A Survey of Results, supra;
Cecelia Elena Rouse, PrivateSchool Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, 113 Q.J. ECON. 553-602 (1992). On whether
school choice and competition could improve the performance of government schools, see
Frederick Hess et al., Coping with Competition: How School Systems Respond to School
Choice, availableat http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg; Jay P. Greene, An Evaluation of the
Florida A-Plus Accountability and School Choice Program (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/research. Finally, for studies suggesting that religious and
other private schools succeed in inculcating civic virtue and public values, see, e.g., A
Survey of Results, supra; Christian Smith & David Sikkink, Is Private School Privatizing?,
FIRST THINGS, Apr. 1999, at 16.
73 Viteritti, supranote 67.
74 Id.
75 As Professor Viteritti has observed, the "would it work" question is made more

difficult by the fact that school choice is rarely given a chance to work. Id. at 38 ("[M]ost
[choice programs] have been designed to limit real competition.... Yes, theoretically the
effect of market competition is measurable empirically, but no, we cannot fully assess it
under the existing plans."). See generally Paul E. Peterson & Chad Noyes, Under Extreme
Duress, School Choice Succeeds, in DIANE RAVITCH & JOSEPH P. VITERIT-rI, NEW
SCHOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY: THE REDESIGN OF URBAN EDUCATION (1999).
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III.

THE COSTS OF CHOICE? ON HOSTAGE-TAKING
AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

The point of this Essay so far has been to suggest that we put
aside for now two often-asked questions about school choice-Is
school choice constitutional? Will it work?-and instead shift the
burden of persuasion to those who oppose choice-based
experiments.
Such a shift by no means ends our public
conversation, though, or predetermines its outcome. The new
question presented-Why not?-is just the beginning.
One common response to this question goes something like
this: Notwithstanding the expressed desire of many parents for
more choices, better services, and enhanced opportunities for their
children, school choice should still be rejected, because voucher
schemes would inevitably undermine the government schools and
their mission. "We can't permit school choice," the argument
goes, "because vouchers will take children, and therefore money,
away from the public schools, where both are desperately
needed.76 As the New York Times put it, it is "irrelevant" that
"many poor families... regard the program as a lifeline."77 The
fact remains, the Times insists, that voucher programs "drain[]
human and financial resources from public education[.]" 78 In a
similar vein, the president of the San Francisco School Board, Jill
Wynns, recently explained why, in her view, it was
"philosophically" unacceptable for a for-profit corporation to run
a school, and why, therefore, a charter school that has apparently
enjoyed great success with inner-city children should nonetheless
be closed: "Any parent is going to say," she conceded, "'I want
more for my kid.' But at the expense of everyone else? No." 79
Even if we were to concede-though there is no reason we
should-that expanding parental choice in education would harm
government schools, and the children who attend them, the fact is,
as Professor Eugene Volokh has observed, that "the Constitution
does not have a You May Not Hurt Government-Run Schools
Clause[.]" 8 This is not to say, of course, that we should be
76 See, e.g., Meet the Press, supra note 26 (then-Vice-President Gore speaking);
Alvarez, supra note 15 (recounting statements made by Senators Clinton and Kennedy).
77A Matter of Church and State, supra note 2.
78 Id.
79 Deroy Murdock, Parents v. Educrats, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (May 31, 2000), at
http://www.nationalreview.com.
80Volokh, supra note 22, at 360.
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indifferent to the possibility that choice and competition could
negatively affect government schools. It does suggest, though, that

bare assertions about, say, "cream skimming" or "draining
resources," standing alone, are not particularly powerful
arguments against choice." The question remains, after all, why
concerns about stability of the government-school system, or the
job security of its employees, should trump the desire of some lowincome children to leave for something better.
It is worth remembering here that the present near-monopoly
over public education enjoyed by the government schools in the
United States is an anomaly.s2 Supreme Court and other
boosterism notwithstanding, 3 there is nothing given or sacrosanct
about it. If it were to turn out-again, there is no reason to think it
would-that giving parents and children more options somehow
worked to the detriment of government schools and public
employees, one reasonable response might be, "so what?" Of
course, there are powerful, perhaps even convincing, rejoinders
one could make to such a response, but they should be proffered
and debated, rather than assumed. Certainly, the overriding
consideration should be what is best for children, not what is best
for teachers and schools. They are not necessarily the same
thing.8
s With respect to the "cream skimming" argument (i.e., the claim that school choice
will lure away only the best students from failing public schools, leaving the most troubled
children behind), research suggests that, in fact, low-achieving children are more likely to
use vouchers to leave government schools. See, e.g., John F. Witte, First Year ReportMilwaukee Parental Choice Program,at 8-9 (1991); see generally Howard L. Fuller, The
Saturation Campaign of Lies and DistortionsAbout Educational Vouchers (Mar. 2000),
available at http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org./servlets/SendArticle/30/saturcam.pdf (last
visited Jun. 6, 2002).
8 See, e.g., Ted Forstmann, Break Up the Education Monopoly, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,
1999, at A26:
The U.S., we are led to believe, was founded upon a system of governmentprovided education; tinker with it, and you tinker with the underpinnings of our
In reality, government-delivered education-a.k.a. 'public
democracy.
education'-wasn't established until roughly a century after our country's
founding. The system it replaced- the system of education our country was
founded upon-was characterized above all by diversity, competition and
choice.
Id. See generally ANDREW J. COULSON, MARKET EDUCATION: THE UNKNOWN
HISTORY (1999).
83 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241-42 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan wrote:
It is implicit in the history and character of American public education that the
public schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of American citizens
in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any
sort-an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to all
American groups and religions.
Id.
84 Over a century ago, one observer complained, "we have made a sort of God out of
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More to the point, the insistence of some choice opponents
that "we need your child to prop up the public schools" is, from a
moral point of view, no more palatable, and should be no more
convincing, than any other hostage-taking argument:
Students shouldn't be means to the end of improving
government schools-government schools should be a means to
the end of improving each student.
Good students aren't just tools that are available for the
government to use in order to improve the quality of its schools
(or even to improve the quality of education of other, not-sogood students). It's wrong to deprive the good students of
educational choices so they can remain trapped in government
schools for the government schools' benefit. Even if there are
good arguments for not helping parents who choose to send
their kids to private schools, "we need your kid at the
government school to make the school better" is not among
them."
Columnist William Raspberry poses the question this way:
"[L]ook at it from the viewpoint of parents who grab at the chance
to get their children into better schools: Should they be required to
keep their children in bad schools to keep those schools from
growing worse? '86 I do not think that they should. And, in
response to the congresswoman who justified her opposition to
President Bush's vouchers initiative by asking, "[h]ow can we in
good conscience select a few children from a school system to get
vouchers and leave the rest of the children behind?,"87 one might

answer, "how can we not?" While we debate the effects of escape,
"too many students pay dearly, and for the rest of their lives."88
There is another common, related response to the "why not?"
question: For some, the concern is not simply, or merely, that
government schools will close or cut back, but instead that their
mission-to create a well-educated and tolerant citizenry that is
united by certain shared values and loyalties and, at the same time,
by its appreciation for our ethnic, cultural, and religious
diversity-will be undermined. The fear is not just that private
schools will "win out" in a competitive market for education, but
that such a win would balkanize our communities and hamstring
the civic development of our children, as private schools transmit
an unhealthy sectarian narrowness and fail to foster the desired
our common school system. It is treason to speak a word against it." VITERITrI, supra
note 11, at 151 (citation omitted).
85 Volokh, supra note 22, at 361.
86 Walter Raspberry, Not Enough Lifeboats, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1998, at A19.
87 Eilperin, supra note 14.
88 A Voucher Test, supra note 12.
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degree of public engagement. We might think of this as the
"bowling alone 8' 9 or "social capital" 90 argument.
We need not embrace the statism inherent in some theorists'
views of education9' to agree that the health of civil society
depends crucially on the formation, development, and training of
capable and decent persons who are concerned with and motivated
by the common good. We can agree with, for instance, Professor
Viteritti that "a well educated citizenry is among the most critical
factors for ensuring the stability of a democracy" and that "public
education"-rightly understood-"serves as a foundation for
92 It turns out, though, that
American democracy as we know it."1
"Catholic, Protestant, and nonreligious private schooling and
home schooling families are consistently more involved in a wide
spectrum of civic activities than are families of public school
children."93 Indeed, religious schools have, throughout our history,
played a crucial role not in balkanizing us but in "advancing the
democratic ethos":
Research shows that adults who have attended parochial
schools display high levels of patriotism, tolerance, and civic
involvement.... If designed appropriately, school choice
programs would be particularly beneficial to poor communities,
not only extending educational opportunities, but also
invigorating civic life and addressing the larger problem of
political inequality that besets economically disadvantaged
people.94
As two leading researchers concluded, "Private schooling, it turns
out, is anything but privatizing.""
89 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF

AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining
Social Capital,6 J. DEMOCRACY 65 (1995).
90 See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society: Social
Capital as Substantive Morality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1578 (2001) ("Societies are

high in social capital when trusting attitudes prevail and cooperative activities abound
among citizens. The phrase is meant to identify a central feature of good citizenship and
the importance of social networks to sustaining it: virtuous citizens are active in
cooperative groups, associations, and social networks.").
91 See, e.g., MACEDO, supra note 27; MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL
EDUCATION (1999); GUTMAN, supra note 27; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). For detailed critiques of these arguments, see, e.g., Michael
W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453 (2000);
Stephen G. Gilles, Hey, Christians,Leave Your Kids Alone!, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 149
(1999); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children:A ParentalistManifesto, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 937 (1996).
92 VITERITrI, supra note 11, at 180-81.
93 Smith & Sikkink, supra note 72, at 16.
94 VITERITFI, supra note 11, at 183.
95 Smith & Sikkink, supra note 72, at 16. These researchers' findings might usefully be
compared to those of Robert Putnam, in his study of government and civic engagement in
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In other words, I do not think it can reasonably be said

today-even if perhaps it once could-that school choice or
private schooling is a retreat from, or abandonment of, the
American ideal of the "common school."96 The research and data,
again, suggest otherwise. In fact, "Catholic schools more nearly
approximate the 'common school' ideal of American education
than do public schools."97 Indeed, "there is nothing parochial
about most Catholic schools these days."98

That said, even as we tout the success of religious schools in
this regard, we would do well to cultivate a healthy skepticism

about the "ideal" itself. In particular, we might recall that the
common-school movement was nurtured and animated in large
part by suspicion and hostility toward the Roman Catholic Church,
its teachings, its perceived ambitions, and its schools. It is fair to
say that, for at least a century, the education debate and the

defense of government schools were inseparable from the
respectable anti-Catholicism of America's judicial and intellectual
elites. 99 This is neither special pleading nor the rhetoric of
Italy. ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIvIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY (1993). He concluded that .
[m]embership rates in hierarchically ordered organizations (like the Mafia or the
institutional Catholic Church) should be negatively associated with good
government; in Italy, at least, the most devout churchgoers are the least civicm.inded.... Good government in Italy is a by-product of singing groups and
soccer clubs, not prayer.
Id. at 175-76; see also Macedo, supra note 90 (discussing and supplementing Putnam's
work and conclusions).
96See Peter Beinart, Degree of Separation,NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 1997, at 6.
97JAMES COLEMAN ETAL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT 185 (1982); see also Joseph

M. O'Keefe, S.J., What Research Tells Us About the Contributionsof Sectarian Schools, 78
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 425 (2001) (offering "reflections on the contributions of
sectarian schools to the common good").
98 Terry Golway, The Modem Mosaic of CatholicEducation, AMERICA, May 28, 2001,
at 6 ("Catholic schools are no longer the homogenous institutions of the past, and today's
Catholic school graduates will go into the world as prepared as any children for the diverse
and complex world of the 21st century."); Macedo, supra note 90, at 1586:
In his study of America, Putnam found that mainline Protestant and Catholic
churches seem to help mobilize civic engagement. They have the qualities of
bridging associations. Instead of monopolizing their congregants attention or
discouraging wider social involvements, members of these communities tend to
become involved in helping to lead secular civic groups.
Id.
99See generally VITERITrI, supra note 11; CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH
OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-

PUBLIC SCHOOL 1825-1925 (1987); DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: A
HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1974); John T. McGreevy,

Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination,1928-1.960,
84 J. AM. HIST. 97 (1997). But see MACEDO, supra note 27, at 88 ("It is too simple to say
that the early common schools were in the business of 'Protestantizing' Catholic
immigrants.... To a significant degree, the common schools represented a shared civic
vision. Convergence on that vision could not... be taken for granted.").
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grievance; it is simply a fact. The hopes of Horace Mann, John
Dewey, and their successors for a cohesive and engaged citizenry
formed in the crucible of government education went hand-inhand with their aggressive protestantizing, and then secularizing,
aspirations. As Professor John Coons has noted, "[t]he machinery
of public monopoly was chosen specifically by brahmins... to
coax the children of immigrants from the religious superstitions of
their barbarian parents."' ° It is not entirely clear that much has
changed in this regard. In the course of laying out their theories of
the appropriate function of education in a secular, liberal society,
many theorists are increasingly candid in their criticisms of
authentically religious education, and increasingly wary of the
destabilizing and divisive potential of traditional religious beliefs. 0l
These two responses to the "why not?" question-i.e., that
school choice would undermine both the institutions and the
mission of the American system of public education-open the
door to important conversations about the purpose of education
and the prerogatives of the state. They deserve and require a
response-a more detailed response, of course, than I could or
have tried to provide in this Essay. In my view, though, it should
not be enough for those who oppose increased opportunities for
choice in education merely to raise the specter of governmentschool embarrassment. Lack of government confidence in its own
product is no reason to protect that product, particularly not at the
expense of disadvantaged and at-risk children. I would also submit
that "public" education is not reducible to education in
government-owned buildings, by government employees,
according to government-sanctioned methods and curricula. To
recognize as much is not to charge down the path of social division
and disengagement. Public-mindedness and civic engagement
need not require involvement in government-run or statesanctioned institutions."2 After all, as Tocqueville emphasized,
and as many contemporary civil-society thinkers have re-

100
Coons, supra note 20, at 19 ("Today that antique machinery continues its designated
role, and if this function was ever benign, it has long since ceased to be so.").
101See, e.g., MACEDO, supra note 27, at 147 ("Some religious beliefs are at odds with
liberalism itself. We should tolerate the intolerant.., but we need not bend over
backwards to make life easy for them."); JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V.
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998). Similar views have, unfortunately, also been expressed in
the opinions of Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 711 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 244-47 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
635 n.20 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
102See, e.g., Coons, supra note 7, at 22. ("To render coherent the debates on education
we would need to give correct names to the phenomena at issue, exercising self-restraint in
the use of 'public."').
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discovered, a healthy and vibrant democracy requires not only a
state, but also intermediate institutions and voluntary associations
to serve as buffers, and to mediate relations, between the
individual and that state. 103 In any event, to the extent opposition
to choice is grounded in romantic attachment to an imagined
common-school ideal, to a totalizing version of liberalism, or to
various religious and anti-religious prejudices, it is irreconcilable
both with the historical record and with our professed embrace of
genuine pluralism and religious freedom.

IV.

TOWARD A NEW CONVERSATION

As I said at the outset, my goal with this Essay is to propose a
revised agenda for our public conversations about education
reform and school choice. My aim is to shift the focus of the
debate from the Establishment Clause, empirical analysis, and
efficiency to broader questions about education, pluralism,
religious freedom, and the common good." In suggesting such a
shift, I am in good company. After all, Professor Coons has made
the case, in a short essay now nearly ten years old, that
[s]hifting educational authority from government to parents is a
policy that rests upon basic beliefs about the dignity of the
person, the rights of children, and the sanctity of the family; it is
a shift that also promises a harvest of social trust as the

experience of responsibility is extended to all." 5
These "larger reasons for believing in choice" are, he insisted,
"equal in dignity to those that underlie our great constitutional
freedoms."'06
In this last Part, then, I want to highlight some of these "larger
reasons for believing in choice" by drawing on several of the
animating themes in the "social teaching" of the Catholic

103 There is, of course, a huge and exploding literature on voluntary associations--the
"little platoons" of democracy-and their place in civil society. The best place to start is
still ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 489-99 (Harvey C. Mansfield
& Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1838). See also, e.g., PETER L.
BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
104For a related discussion, see Richard W. Garnett, Common Schools and the
Common Good: Reflections on the School-Choice Debate, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 219
(2001).
105 Coons, supra note 20, at 15.
106 Id.
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Church. °7 To be sure, each of these themes deserves, requires, and
has received far more detailed and nuanced treatment than I
provide here. I should also emphasize that these themes, and the
Church's claims about them, are intended to have more than a
narrowly sectarian or particularistic appeal. They sound not only
in faith, but also in social philosophy; they draw on reason no less
than on revelation. They are an invitation to dialogue, extended
"to all people of good will." '°s I mean, and I hope, for this Essay to
be a similar invitation.
A.

Solidarity and the PreferentialOptionfor the Poor

It is worth remembering that school choice's intellectual and
rhetorical roots are in the War on Poverty as much as the social
conservatism of the so-called Religious Right or the individualism
of libertarian economists. 9 It should therefore come as no
surprise that many contemporary advocates for choice-based
reform tend to frame the issue in terms of social justice and equal
opportunity. It is, after all, a fact-one for which no citation
should be required-that, to the extent our government-run public
schools are failing, their failure is falling most heavily on poor
people.
The widespread recognition of this fact, and the
corresponding claim that expanding and subsidizing parental
choice in education is a way of offering hope and opportunity to
many low-income people, connects nicely with the basic theme in
Catholic social thought of a "preferential option for the poor." As
Pope Leo XIII put it more than a century ago, in what one of his
successors once called the Magna Carta of the Church's modem
social teaching, "the poor and helpless have a claim to special
consideration.
The richer population have many ways of
protecting themselves, and stand less in need of help from the
State; those who are badly off have no resources of their own to
fall back upon."" 0
107 "Catholic Social Teaching" is a term commonly used to denote the body of
encyclical letters and conciliar declarations--starting with Pope Leo XIII's Rerum
novarum (1891), and including, for example, John Paul II's Centissimus annus (1991) and
Veritatis splendor (1993)-in which the Church has addressed all men and women of good
will concerning the morality of the social order. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH § 2419-2425 (Paulist Press 1994) (providing an overview of the "social doctrine
of the Church") [hereinafter CATECHISM]. For a brief introduction to this body of
teaching, see, e.g., MICHAEL SCHOOYANS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL TEACHING
OF THE CHURCH (1992).
108

See, e.g., Evangelium vitae [The Gospel of Life] (1995) (introduction).

109 See, e.g., VITERITFI, supra note 11, at 53-57; Coons, supra note 7.
110 Pope Leo XII, Rerum novarum (1891).
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This stance-this "preferential love""'--is grounded not in
paternalism, noblesse oblige, or even in political radicalism, but in
a recognition of the dignity of every human person.' 12 The point is
not merely maintenance, but empowerment. 3 In a sense, this
preferential option can be seen as simply one translation of the
"Golden Rule"-the call to love one's neighbor as oneself. 4 The
connection between this call to solidarity with the poor, on the one
hand, and our conversations about education, on the other, should
be clear, even if the precise policy implications of the call are not.
Just as many school-choice supporters decry the fact that, because
of failing schools, "too many students pay dearly, and for the rest
of their lives,' ' 1 5 John Paul II has emphasized that education is "an
indispensable component of the evangelical preferential option for
11 6
the poor.
Now, it must be conceded that reasonable people of good will,
trying in good faith to think in solidarity with the disadvantaged,
and to act-and to legislate-in accord with the "preferential
option," will likely disagree about the policies to be pursued.
Some will insist-mistakenly, in my opinion-that school choice is
yet another benefit for the well-off, and a threat to the already
precarious situation of the schools that serve the poor. My point
here is simply that this theme challenges us at the very least to
question the fairness and wisdom of policies that keep poor
children trapped in schools that policymakers would never permit
their own children to attend, even as it also challenges us to
evaluate any proposed ameliorative policy initiatives with an eye
to how they will serve these same children.
B.

Subsidiarity

Another animating theme in contemporary Catholic social
teaching-one that should also be, like the "preferential option for
the poor," accessible to those standing outside the Catholic
tradition"'1 -is the principle of "subsidiarity." Subsidiarity, in a
111CATECHISM, supra note 107, § 2448.
112 See, e.g., John Paul II, Solicitudo rei socialis [On Social Concern] T 39, 42 (1987).
113 U.S. Catholic Bishops, Economic Justicefor All [Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social
Teaching and the U.S. Economy] 88 (1986).
114 Id.
115 A Voucher Test, supra note 12.
116 ZENIT, EducationIs Key Part of "Option" for the Poor,Pope Says (Jan. 29, 2001),
availableat http://www.zenit.org.
117 See Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond
Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103, 108 (2001) ("[T]he fact that its roots are in Catholicism
does not make subsidiarity inaccessible to arguments of logic and public policy.").
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nutshell, is the "principle of limited government" according to
which "[t]he state should do only what cannot effectively be done
by private action, and whenever possible the individual should
make his own decisions."18 It should be emphasized, though, that
the Church's claim is not that localism is to be preferred for its
own sake, or at all costs. The teaching reflects not a hostility to
public action, or even to governmental initiative. Rather, it is built
on an appreciation of the social nature and destiny of the human
person, and for the contributions of mediating structures and
associations both to the vitality of civil society and to the authentic
flourishing of persons. 19 The point of the subsidiarity principle is
not so much to dictate any particular policy choice-after all,
reasonable people will disagree about how the theme might best
be implemented "on the ground"-as to suggest an attitude, an
orientation, and an aspiration.
Turning back to the matter of education generally, and school
choice specifically, it seems clear that there should be a place in
our conversations for the principle of subsidiarity. 21 ° John Paul II
has urged, for example, that the "mission of education.., always
be carried out in accordance with a proper application of the
principle of subsidiarity."'21 To opt for school choice is, after all, to
opt for diversity, pluralism, experimentation, mediating
118 David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 2D GREEN BAG 359 n.1 (1998); see also Pope John
Paul II, Centissimus annus [Encyclical Letter on the Hundredth Anniversary of Rerum
novarum] $ 48 (1991), which notes that subsidiarity is the principle according to which
a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a
community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather
should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the
activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.
Id.; Mary Ann Glendon, Civil Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1996, at 39, 40
("Subsidiarity [is] the principle of leaving social tasks to the smallest social unit that can
perform them adequately.") (reviewing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996)); Vischer, supra
note 117, at 103 (defending the claim that "the strictly conservative portrayal of
subsidiarity misconstrues the nature of the Catholic social theory from which the principle
arises").
119 See, e.g., Vischer, supra note 117, at 116. Vischer states that:
Subsidiarity is not a knee-jerk shunning of government authority .... Rather,
subsidiarity is a principled tendency toward solving problems at the local level
and empowering individuals, families and voluntary associations to act more
efficaciously in their own lives. In this regard, the focus is on fostering the
vitality of mediating structures in society.
Id; Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression
of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1849-56 (2001) (discussing function and
importance of mediating associations).
120 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious
Education,and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109,144-145 (2000) (urging a
connection between parents' constitutional right to educate their children in religious
schools and the subsidiarity principle).
121 Pope John Paul 11, Letter to Families$ 16 (1994).
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associations (e.g., religious schools), and families over
centralization, monopoly, stasis, and homogeneity.
Moreover, implicit in the subsidiarity principle is the
recognition that mediating associations not only form and instruct
us, they play a political role as well, serving as the "critical buffers
between the individual and the power of the State. '12 2 They are
the scaffolding around which civil society is constructed, in which
personal freedoms are exercised, loyalties are formed and
transmitted, and individuals flourish. 23' The claim, in other words,
is not merely that the principle of subsidiarity can help us find our
way toward a more efficient and effective delivery of services, but
also that the principle, and the
values it embodies, promotes
124

human freedom more generally.
C.

Education, Family, and Vocation

The family, in Catholic social thought, is both the "first and26
vital cell of society"' 125 and the primary "educating community.'
Put another way, the family is "the first school of the social virtues
that are the animating principle of the existence and development
of society itself. ' 127 Accordingly, and consistent with the principle
of subsidiarity, it is the obligation of the public authority not to
aid to
usurp families' tasks, but rather to "give [them] all possible
' 28
enable them to perform their educational role properly.'
122 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,619 (1984); see also Peter L. Berger & Richard
John Neuhaus, Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus Respond, in To EMPOWER
PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 145, 148 (Michael Novak ed., 1996)
("[Voluntary associations] stand between the private world of individuals and the large,
impersonal structures of modem society. They 'mediate[]' by constituting a vehicle by
which personal beliefs and values could be transmitted into the mega-institutions.").
123 See generally Garnett, supra note 119.
124 See, e.g., J. Verstraeten, Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING 135 (David A. Boileau ed., 1994) (observing that subsidiarity
expresses "a duty of the community to... give [its members] the possibility to develop
themselves to the fullest as people.").
125 Pope John Paul II, supra note 8,
42 (quoting Second Vatican Ecumenical Council,
Apostolicam actuositatem [Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity] T 11); see also, e.g.,
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("It is through the family
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.");
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (noting
the important role of the family in "promotfing] a way of life through the instruction of
children").
126 Pope John Paul II, supra note 8, T 40.
127 Id. T 42.
128 Id.
40; see also John Finnis, Virtue and the Constitution of the United States, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1595, 1601 (2001) (noting, among other things, that the government's
role is "subsidiary" to that of "families, schools, and other institutions of civil society"
when it comes to "inculcating civic virtue").
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But what is "education"? What is the task given to families,
and the vocation entrusted to parents? Properly understood,
education is as much about transmitting values, commitments, and
faith to children as it is about outfitting them with useful data and
"skill sets." Education is
the indivisible process of acquiring beliefs, premises, and
dispositions that are our windows on the world, that mediate
and filter our experience of it, and that govern our evaluation
and judgment of it. Education is what attaches us to those
goods and ends that attract, almost gravitationally, our
decisions and actions." 9
In fact, in his Letter to Families,Pope John Paul II goes so far as to
suggest that the educator is "a person who 'begets' in a spiritual
sense. "130
This is precisely why we care so much about education, and
why the debates concerning choice-based reform are as heated as
they are. It matters to us, not just what our children know, and
what they can do, but also what they value, what they believe, and
who they are. This is why, John Paul II suggests, the raising and
education of children can "be considered a genuine apostolate."'3'
It is also why education is no less a mission for many
contemporary liberal theorists, for whom schooling is not only a
means of staffing the needs of the American economy but also a
way for the state to gain an edge in its competition with parents'
morality and "intolerant" religion for the allegiance of children. It
often seems that arguments against vouchers, and for increased
supervision by government of religious and private schools, are
less about the technical skills these schools do or do not provide to
their students than the extent to which they fail to transmit the
values, habits, and attitudes thought necessary for liberal
citizenship. 3 2 Education is an opportunity to impart loyalties and
inculcate values; it is the arena of character formation and the
1 33
value of soul making.
The point here-the claim proposed in the Church's social
doctrine-is that school choice not only promotes competition,
129

Garnett, supra note 119, at 1846.

130 Pope John Paul II, Letter to Families Tl16 (1994).

Id.
See generally MACEDO, supra note 27; Amy Gutmann, Religious Freedom and Civic
Responsibility, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 907 (1999); Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil
Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations,and Liberal Public Values,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 417 (2000). For the different argument that many religious schools
harm children by failing to equip them with the critical-thinking skills, moral flexibility,
and self-esteem they need to flourish, see DWYER, supranote 101.
133 See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A
MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY (1998).
131

132
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efficiency, and reform, it is also more consistent than monopoly or
government indoctrination with the freedom and moral
responsibilities of parents, and with the integrity and dignity of the
family. Certainly, this is an argument that resonates strongly with
leading themes in American constitutional law. Over seventy-five
years ago, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,13 1 the Supreme Court
affirmed the fundamental right of parents to direct and control the
upbringing and education of their children, insisting that "[t]he
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
' It is, the
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."135
Court added, the constitutional right of parents, and not the
prerogative of the state, "to direct the upbringing and education of
children." '36 As Professor Viteritti observed, however, for many
parents, "the promise of... Pierce"-that is, the promise that
parents could "send their children to schools that reflect their own
values"--"remains a hollow promise, conditioned to a large degree
by the economic position of parents."' 37 By the same token, a
conversation about choice and vouchers that was inspired by the
animating themes of Catholic social teaching would take seriously
the claim that, just as a lack of options threatens to condemn
children to sub-standard training and reduced opportunities, it
tends also to undermine the ability of poor parents and families to
exercise their right, and to fulfill their vocation, to educate their
children.
D.

Education and Religious Freedom

Professor Viteritti has observed that "[t]he calculus of
religious liberty in a free society is determined by the measure of
religiously motivated thought and action that is insulated from
public authority."'3 8 Accordingly, choice in education can, is, and
should be defended as a crucial and constitutive element of
authentic religious freedom. To permit and facilitate educational
choice, the argument goes, is to appreciate that, for many,
education is a profoundly religious enterprise, one that is "rooted
in the primary vocation of married couples to participate in God's
134

268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ("The liberty interest at issue in this case.., is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.").
135 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
136 268 U.S. at 534-35 (1925) (emphasis added); see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
137 VITERITTI, supra note 11, at 143.
138 Id. at 165.

1310

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:4

creative activity.' 39 When education is seen as a "ministry," and
when parents and their chosen agents are regarded as "the first
heralds of the Gospel for their children,"1 40 the connection
between education reform and religious freedom is apparent.
More than fifty years ago, John Courtney Murray highlighted
this connection between school choice, on the one hand, and
religious liberty and pluralism, on the other. 141 Murray reminded
his readers that, as a matter of constitutional law, the right and the
duty of parents to "direct and control" the upbringing and
education of their children trump the aims of the state and are the
"pivotal point of a democratic system.' 14 2 In so doing, he both
echoed and anticipated powerful statements to this effect by the
Council Fathers at Vatican II, who identified choice in education
as one of the "conditions favorable to the fostering of religious
life" that governments are obligated to create and uphold.43 It
was, for them, a requirement of religious liberty that "government
must acknowledge the right of parents to make a genuinely free
choice of schools."' 144
Now, people of good will might well conclude that Murray
and the Council Fathers were mistaken, and that-while
constitutional-government efforts to increase parental choice in
education will not, in fact, promote and protect religious freedom.
Some might fear, for instance, that school-voucher programs
would result in religious schools and institutions becoming
dependent on government funds. Or, they might worry that such
programs could open the doors of religious schools to an array of
intrusive and secularizing regulations that these schools might lack
the will power or the foresight to resist.1 45 The point here is simply
to suggest that we shift our focus from the technicalities and
niceties of First Amendment doctrine and instead frame our
education-reform discussions around, and evaluate our
educational policies with reference to, a rich understanding of
authentic religious freedom and of the right and obligation of the
human person to search for and cling to God.1 46
139Pope John Paul

I1,
supra note 8, T1 36, 38.
39.
141John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?,14 LAw & CONTEMP.
140Id. T

PROBS.

23

(1949).
142 Id. at 36.
143Dignitatishumanae [Declaration on Religious Freedom] 6 (1965).
144Id. 1 5.
45 See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First
Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 301, 339-41 (2000) (discussing the
"regulatory strings" concern).
146See Dignitatis humanae,supra note 143, 912.
It is in accordance with their dignity as persons.., that all men should be at once
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E.

The Common Good

In the end, the measure of any public-policy proposal or
experiment should be its relation to, and effect upon, the common
good. This is easy to say-too easy, perhaps. What is the
"common good"? Is it just a clich? How is its pursuit
distinguishable from the homogenizing aims of the common-school
movement and the secularizing ambitions of its contemporary
theoretical descendants?
For Roman Catholics, and in the social teaching of the
Catholic Church, the "common good embraces the sum of those
conditions of social life by which individuals, families, and groups
can achieve their own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and
ready way."'47 It "consists in the protection of the rights, and in the
performance of the duties, of the human person[,]' 48 and "resides
in the conditions for the exercise of the natural freedoms
'
indispensable for the development of the human vocation." 49
Clearly, there is a lot worth saying about these few sentences.
Note, in particular, that the "common good" cannot be equated
simply with the good of the government, state, or group. Nor is it
merely the "greatest good for the greatest number."'5 ° Of course
the good of the community is to be desired, but, in the end, it is the
dignity of each particular human person-who, to be sure, truly
thrives in political community with others-that ultimately must
be the end of, and benchmark for, the common good. That is, the
common good is a set of "conditions of social life" through which
we all enjoy our rights, flourish and are fulfilled, and become what
we ought and are called to be. Seen this way, the Catholic
understanding of the common good is both anti-statist, in that it
incorporates the principle of subsidiarity, and the insight that the
person, the family, and the mediating associations of civil society
impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth,
especially religious truth. They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is
known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth.
Id.
147 Gaudium et spes [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World]

74;
supra note 107, § 1906.
'48 Dignitatis humanae,supra note 143, T 6; CATECHISM, supra note 107, § 1907 ("[Tjhe
common good presupposes respect for the person as such"). This does not mean that
Catholic teaching regards the well-being of the state as irrelevant to the common good.
See, e.g., CATECHISM, supra note 107, § 1908 ("[T]he common good requires the social
well-being and development of the group itself.").
"' CATECHISM, supra note 107, § 1907.
CATECHISM,

150 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 154 (1980).
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are prior in dignity and right to the state; and it is personalist, in
that its focus and end is the authentic development of the human
person in community over the claims, goals, and values of
government. The "common good" question-in the school-choice
context, as everyplace else-is, in the end, an anthropological
question; it is, "what is good for the person?" and not, "what is
good for the state and its institutions?"
What does all this mean for our school-choice discussions?
Just this-the subtext (if not the text itself) of the "who decides?"
debate in education has for the most part been a fight over the
rhetorical purchase of terms like the "common good" and the
"common" or "public" school." As I suggested earlier, the twists
and turns of the Supreme Court's First Amendment case law
reflect, in large measure, the degree to which the Court has been
willing to constitutionalize the views of those for whom the
mission of religious schools is at odds with their understanding of
the common good. As the Court in Mitchell and other decisions
repairs gradually the harms done during these twists and turns, it is
worth making the case that school choice should be pursued not
simply because it is constitutionally permissible, but because it
serves and coheres with the common good, and with authentic
religious and political freedom.
Indeed, the case for choice must be framed explicitly in such
terms. The argument must be made that what we too quickly call
our "public" school system is, in Professor Coons' words, "an
inward-turning monopoly that... serves only itself [and that] goes
out of its way to disfavor the working class and the poor who
cannot escape its grasp""'5 and who are, in effect, "captive
audiences" for whatever ideological "gospel" government decides
to deliver.' 2 Educational choice is the surest and fairest route to
the truly common good and, by extension, to the fulfillment and
flourishing of every child. It is, in other words, one of those
"conditions of social life" that is constitutive of the common good.

CONCLUSION

As I write, on February 20, 2002, reports are starting to filter
in from friends, colleagues, and news reporters about the oral
arguments heard today in Zelman, the Ohio school-choice case. It
appears that the lawyers' arguments and the Justices' questions
151 John E. Coons, Is Choice Still a
152 Coons, supra note 7, at 22.

Choice?, FIRST THINGS, Aug./Sept. 1994, at 10.
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have boosted the cautious optimism of those who support school
choice and who believe choice programs are constitutional. We
will see.
As I said at the outset, I think that the Court should uphold
the Ohio program, which does not unconstitutionally endorse,
coerce, fund directly, or otherwise "establish" religion. The
argument here, though, has been that school choice is not simply a
matter of spurring improvements through competition, or of
delivering publicly funded education in a fairer way; it is about
authentic religious, political, and personal freedom. The point of
educational choice is not simply to meet in a cost-effective fashion
the government's asserted need for well-trained workers and
citizens, but rather to promote the dignity and flourishing of
parents and children in families, associations, and communities.
I believe that this way of framing the issues and posing the
questions, coupled with a searching engagement with some of the
prominent themes in contemporary Catholic social teaching, sets
the stage for a productive, and perhaps even inspiring, public
conversation about education, religious freedom, social justice,
and the common good.

